Factors to Curb Tax Evasion: Evidences from the TAXSIM Agent-Based Simulation Model by Gulyás, László et al.
    
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES BUDAPEST, 2015 
 
MT-DP – 2015/21 
 
 
 
Factors to Curb Tax Evasion:  
Evidence from the TAXSIM Agent-Based 
Simulation Model  
LÁSZLÓ GULYÁS – TAMÁS MÁHR –   
ISTVÁN JÁNOS TÓTH 
 
 
2 
 
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2015/21 
 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
Factors to Curb Tax Evasion: Evidences from the TAXSIM Agent-Based Simulation Model  
Authors: 
 
 
László Gulyás  
director of research 
AITIA International, Inc. 
e-mail: lgulyas@aitia.ai 
 
 
Tamás Máhr  
project manager 
AITIA International, Inc. 
e-mail: tmahr@aitia.ai 
 
 
 István János Tóth 
senior research fellow 
Institute of Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
e-mail: toth.istvanjanos@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2015 
 
 
ISBN 978-615-5447-82-2 
ISSN 1785 377X 
 
 
3 
 
Factors to Curb Tax Evasion: Evidence from the TAXSIM 
Agent-Based Simulation Model 
 
László Gulyás – Tamás Máhr – István János Tóth 
 
Abstract 
 
Agent based models are proposed as an adequate tool for analysing tax payer decisions and, 
thereby, the consequences of such decisions as they manifest themselves at the macro level. 
TAXSIM models the conduct of agents of three types, i.e. employers, employees and the 
government, in an economy of a single sector. Using this model, we examine the conduct of 
each individual agent and the impact of their decisions on the size of tax evasion and 
aggregated tax revenues. The main objective is the analysis of the relations between the 
government and tax payers, as well as the identification of how this relationship affects tax 
evasion. 
In this paper, the operation of several factors affecting the incidence of non-registered 
employment is studied with the help of an improved version of the TAXSIM agent-based 
simulation model. We analyse the effects of unemployment experience, the quality of 
government services and the audit strategy of the tax authority on totally hidden, mixed 
(hidden and legal) and totally legal payments. We start by a brief overview of the TAXSIM 
model and introduce the novel components in detail. This is followed by a thorough analysis 
of a vast series of computational experiments, analysing the behavior of the base model, as 
well as the effect of the newly introduced components (i.e., unemployment experience, 
adaptive audit strategy, etc.) and their various parameters. 
Our computational results suggest that the government can use effective tools to improve tax 
morale and curb tax evasion. Beyond improving the frequency and precision of tax audits the 
implementation of an adaptive tax audit strategy, the reduction of the exposure to 
unemployment or, on the motivation side, the improvement of the quality of government 
services can also be effective. 
Revised version of the paper presented in Münster at the Shadow 2013 Conference  
(http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/shadow2013/) 
 
Keywords: tax evasion, quality of governmnet, unemployment, social network, agent 
based model 
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Az adócsalást csökkentő tényezők:  
eredmények a TAXSIM ágens alapú szimulációs modellből 
 
Gulyás László – Máhr Tamás – Tóth István János 
Összefoglaló 
 
Agens alapú modellek megfelelő eszközként javasolhatók az adófizetői döntések elemzésére 
és ezáltal annak elemzésére is, hogy milyen következményekkel járnak ezek a döntések makro 
szinten. TAXSIM-modell három szereplő – a munkáltató, a munkavállaló és a kormányzat – 
magatartását veszi figyelembe egy egyszektoros gazdaságban. A modell segítségével az egyes 
szereplők magatartásának hatását vizsgáljuk az adócsalás elterjedtségére és az összesített 
adóbevételekre. Az elemzés fő célja a kormányat és az adófizetők közötti kapcsolat vizsgálata, 
és az, hogy e kapcsolat hogyan hat az adócsalás elterjedtségére. 
A tanulmányban több különböző tényezőnek a nem regisztrált foglalkoztatásra gyakorolt 
hatását vizsgáljuk az általunk korábban létrehozott TAXSIM ágens alapú szimulációs modell 
továbbfejlesztett változatával. Elemezzük a munkanélküliségi tapasztalatnak, a kormányzati 
szolgáltatások minőségének, az adóhatóság ellenőrzési stratégiájának a hatását a teljesen 
rejtett, vegyes (rejtett és legális) és teljesen legális kifizetések gyakoriságára. A tanulmány 
első részében a TAXSIM-modell rövid áttekintését adjuk, majd részletesen ismertetjük a 
modell új összetevőit. Ezt követi több számítási, futtatási kísérlet alapos elemzése, amelyben 
először az alapmodell működését vizsgáljuk, majd ennek újonnan bevezetett komponenseit 
(pl. a munkanélküliségi tapasztalat, az adaptív ellenőrzési stratégia stb) különböző 
paraméterek mellett. 
A számítási eredmények azt sugallják, hogy a kormány hatékony eszközöket használhat az 
adózási morál javítására és az adócsalás megfékezésére. Azon túl, hogy gyakoribbá teszi az 
adózók ellenőrzését és az adóellenőrzések pontosságát, egy adaptív adóellenőrzési stratégia 
bevezetése, a munkanélküliség gazdaságon belüli szerepének csökkentése, vagy a 
kormányzati szolgáltatások minőségének javítása egyaránt hatékony stratégiaként kínálkozik. 
 
Tárgyszavak: adócsalás, kormányzat minősége, munkanélküliség, társadalmi 
kapcsolathálók, ágens alapú modell 
JEL kódok: H26, C63, E24 
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Introduction 
The microeconomic models (Allingham–Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973; Alm, 1988; Cowell, 
1985; Sandmo, 1981) describe taxpayer conduct with the help of one or several utility 
functions. In such models, depending on the standpoint of the particular model, either the 
tax payer or the government tries to maximise their utility. The weakness of approaches of 
this kind is the utility function itself, which, let alone that it defines only a single and 
unchangeable strategy for every agent (e.g. tax payers), it also degrades society into the 
aggregate of stand-alone agents. 
In contrast, the agent-based models implement all agents, with possibly varying and 
evolving strategies, as well as their connections and influences on each other. Thus, they offer 
to be an adequate tool for analysing tax payer decisions and, thereby, the consequences of 
such decisions as they manifest themselves at the macro level. The initial agent-based tax 
evasion models expanded the use of utility functions through the application of 
inhomogeneous agents, each of which optimizes its own (and, perhaps the social) utility by 
one of the several possible utility functions (Davis–Hecht–Perkins, 2003; Mittone–Patelli, 
2000). Subsequent models convert the coefficients derived from the utility function into 
agents, turning into complex behaviour, for example, tax audits (Balsa–Antunes–Respício–
Coelho, 2006). In addition several developments also emerge like, for example, the tax payer 
social network, as an important parameter of the model (Bloomquist, 2006). A further step 
ahead was made (Hokamp–Pickhardt, 2010), when the authors analysed, using four agent 
types (maximizing, imitating, ethical and random), the impact of government policies on tax 
payer behaviour. In addition to the models based on standard microeconomic assumptions 
the analyses that constitute models capable of reproducing the results of agent-based models 
can be taken as an expansion of such approaches. Such is the use of the standard model of 
statistical mechanics (Pickhardt – Seibold, 2011). Another relevant path is the use of a 
research strategy, which compares the results of the model assuming social preferences with 
those derived from the agent-based model based on assuming the heterogeneous conduct 
and heuristic decisions of agents (Méder–Simonovits–Vincze, 2012). 
The approach we have used in TAXSIM models the conduct of agents of three types, i.e. 
employers, employees and the government, in an economy in which there is a single sector. 
We examine, using various parameter settings, the conduct of each agent and the impact of 
their decisions on the size of tax evasion and aggregated tax revenues (Szabó et al, 2008; 
Szabó et al. 2010; Szabó et al., 2011). The main objective of the research has been the analysis 
of the relations between the government and tax payers, as well as the identification of how 
this relationship affects tax evasion. 
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In this paper we expand the TAXSIM model through resolving several limiting 
assumptions having been used earlier and examine the impact of the same on tax paying 
behaviour and aggregated tax revenues. Furthermore we also analyse the possible effects of 
several governmental initiatives.  
First, the government may enhance the efficiency of tax audits. In particular, the tax 
authority follows an adaptive strategy of tax audits (Section 4). In the second case, , the 
government improves the level of services offered to employers and employees (Section 6). 
Third, the effects of the implementation and increase of the minimum wage, as a 
governmental measure, is also analysed on tax payment behavior (Section 5).  
In addition to the relationship between the government and tax payers, we also examine 
how tax payment behaviour depends on the structure of the social networks of employees’ 
and employers’ (Section 7). Finally, we analyse how employees' earlier unemployment 
experience changes the amount of tax evasion (Section 8). 
In Section 2 we describe the respective elements of the TAXSIM model in a greater detail. 
Section 3 offers an analysis about the general conduct of the model as a function of various 
parameter settings. These analyses will help us to familiarize with the behaviour of the model 
in the various parameter ranges, so that such parameter ranges can be brought into 
correlation with the observed behaviours of the economic and political model and we can 
select the settings using which to continue our experiments. 
 
1.  THE TAX EVASION MODEL 
 
The TAXSIM model is concerned with the operations of a single market sector, where there 
are four kinds of agents involved: employee, employer, (tax) authority and government. The 
economic well-being of employees depend on their net wages, while that of the employers’ is 
a function of the market demand and the level of gross wages they are forced to pay. The rate 
of tax evasion is an agreement between an employer and an employee that is made when the 
employee occupies a new job. As the agreed employment type determines the income of the 
employee and the (producing) costs of the employer, both participating agents have a 
motivation to evade. 
The government and the tax authority have service providing and regulatory roles, 
respectively. Since the market demand is modeled as an exogenous component and 
employers and employees are assumed to be homogeneous in technological and productive 
ability, competitiveness is determined by the agents’ approach to taxes. 
In this model tax evasion is a technique to reduce costs (and to raise wages). Therefore a 
more refined measure of level of the evasion fits better our purposes than the classical binary 
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or ternary choice (e.g., complier/evader, or complier/evader/skeptic). Thus, we used the five 
types of income (those found empirically most common in Hungary – both legal and non-
registered ones) to create employment types. An employment type is the combination of 
reported wage, fringe benefits, ad hoc engagement agreement, unreported wage and payment 
in kind (see Table 1 for the 23 possibilities). Note that fringe benefits have no meaning 
without a reported wage, so all combinations that include the first without the other (8 
pieces) are omitted. Furthermore, the employment types are grouped so that when there’s no 
reported wage it is termed non-registered (or hidden) and it is called legal when there’s only 
reported wage and fringe benefits. The remaining combinations belong to the group of mixed 
employment. 
The agents have no perfect information about the policies of the government and of the 
accuracy of the tax authority. These they learn from previous experiences and via interactions 
within their social network. Thus, in addition to the agents, the last major component of the 
model is the social network of both the employees and the firms. The employees and 
employers use their knowledge during the so called negotiation process that takes place when 
an employee occupies a new job. During the negotiation procedure both the employer’s and 
the employee’s expectations depend on their respective satisfaction with the government and 
on the estimated costs and benefits of evasion. Previous interactions with the authority agent 
(audits) and information derived from the social network determine cost and benefit 
estimations. It is also assumed that all agents utilize some services provided by the 
government (e.g. a company wants to register a trademark, or a person wants to get a 
passport). These interactions (the experienced effectiveness, corruption, etc.) determine the 
contentment of the agent. 
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Table 1.1 
The 23 employment types 
No. 
Reported 
wage 
Fringe 
benefits 
Invoiced 
payments 
Unreported 
wage 
(Concealed 
cash payments) 
Payment in 
kind 
Type 
1 ●     Legal 
2 ● ●    Legal 
3 ●  ●   Mixed 
4 ●   ●  Mixed 
5 ●    ● Mixed 
6 ● ● ●   Mixed 
7 ● ●  ●  Mixed 
8 ● ●   ● Mixed 
9 ●  ● ●  Mixed 
10 ●  ●  ● Mixed 
11 ●   ● ● Mixed 
12 ● ● ● ●  Mixed 
13 ● ● ●  ● Mixed 
14 ● ●  ● ● Mixed 
15 ●  ● ● ● Mixed 
16 ● ● ● ● ● Mixed 
17   ●   Hidden 
18   ● ●  Hidden 
19   ●  ● Hidden 
20   ● ● ● Hidden 
21    ●  Hidden 
22    ● ● Hidden 
23     ● Hidden 
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The model of the market sector is kept as simple as possible. Companies (employers) 
producing the cheapest goods sell first. When demand is less than the actual productivity, 
companies producing most expensive goods will meet losses that may force them towards 
evasion. A similar force is faced by the employees: after a period of unemployment (the 
length depending on the agent’s reserves that in turn, depend on the length of previous 
employment) an employee decreases its expectations and will eventually accept any job offer. 
The novelty of TAXSIM is that taxpayer compliance is strongly affected by the 
environment of the agent. An agent who decides to evade tax on a certain level has to find a 
job offer that meets her preferences: if she is unable to find one, she will make a compromise 
and accept an available offer that is closest to her preference. The other novelty is that agents 
accept the need for taxes in TAXSIM. That is, taxpayers experience taxes as the price of 
services they use (e.g. courts, education, etc.). 
In the following, we detail the properties and behavior of the individual model 
components. 
EMPLOYERS 
The main attributes of an employer are: list of employees, compliance level, level of 
satisfaction, current job offer (if any), budget, the amount of produced goods per month, 
estimated accuracy of the authorities, estimated frequency of audits. Initially, all employers 
have the same amount of money, an initial job offer, and no employees hired. Employer 
agents start to operate by hiring employees and selling products. Costs are the wages, while 
income is the price of the sold products (the price of a single product depends on the 
employer’s average wage cost and the profit margin, the latter being a model parameter). 
Employers operate until becoming bankrupt. 
Employers have an implicit strategy to produce as cheap as possible, which is realized by 
making tax evasion deals with employees. The key this is the negotiation process, in which 
employers make job offers. A job offer is a pair of a wage and an employment type. The 
overall production cost per employee (i.e., the gross salary) is assumed to be fixed, thus the 
agent’s decision is about the tax evasion rate. The agents try to optimize the following 
function: 
 
V(B, a2) = B(a1 – a2) – pqfB(a1 – a2) → max(a2) . (1) 
 
Where B is the gross salary (constant within a simulation), a1 is the tax rate (constant 
within a simulation), a2 is the actual tax rate paid, p is the chance of audit, q is the chance of 
being caught during an audit in case of evasion (accuracy of the authority) and f is the fine 
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rate (constant within a simulation). The agent learns the value of p and q. The following 
formula is equivalent to (1): 
 
V(B, a2) = B(a1 – a2)  (1 – pqf) → max(a2) . (2) 
 
Equation (2) implies that when pqf =1 then the value of a2 is indifferent; when pqf>1 
evasion produces deficit; while when pqf<1 evasion produces profit. Evaluating (2) is the 
basic decision procedure when an employer offers a new job. Altering the offer means that 
the employer shifts her current compliance level (that is between 0 and the tax rate) one step 
towards the profitable direction (for example: when pqf < 1 and the compliance level is 
mapped to employment type 7, then the employer will offer a new job with type 8 – see Table 
1 for employment types). 
However, the above function is constrained by the employer’s contentment level, derived 
from governmental interactions that determine the minimum level of compliance (that can 
be zero). Moreover, the produced new offer needs to match the employee’s preferences. 
Feedback from employees modifies the employer’s strategy when no one accepts the offer for 
a period of time. 
EMPLOYEES 
The main attributes of an employee are: employer (if any), employment type, savings, and the 
level of satisfaction. TAXSIM employees attempt to get a job of their preferences, or any job 
possible if they are unemployed for a given amount of time. Employees try to maximize their 
income by avoiding taxes, counting in the potential drawbacks of evasion (e.g. lower expected 
pension, higher medical costsii, etc.). Note that a greater take-home wage doesn’t necessarily 
imply a greater expected income automatically due to additional estimated costs. Expected 
income is calculated by the following function: 
 
v(N, 1, 2) = N – p1N1f – p2k . (3) 
 
Where N is the take-home wage, 1 is the evaded tax percent, 2 is the evaded medical 
insurance (in percent), p1 is the chance of being caught, p2 is the chance of illness, f is the fine 
rate, and k is the medical cost. The agent learns the value of p1 and p2. When an employee 
looks for a job she will evaluate more than one offers using equation (3). If all of the offers are 
too non-registered (compared to the agent’s minimum level of compliance) and the employee 
has savings (practically, she has not been unemployed for a long period) then she won’t 
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accept any of the offers but keep searching. She will accept the best offer otherwise. 
(Unemployed agents do not pay any taxes.) 
An employee (or an employer) evaluates equation (2) (or (3)) only when a decision is to 
be made: e.g., when looking for a new job (or wants to hire a new employee). That means 
agents don’t change their compliance level periodically. Employers apply no radical changes 
on their compliance as they alter their offers by shifting the current compliance level (that is 
between 0 and the tax rate) one step towards the profitable direction. 
Employees live forever: there is no ageing or any fluctuation in the population of the 
employees. The financial status of the employee has no effect on her work abilities, but it 
shortens the period she looks for a desirable job. 
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
TAXSIM includes two distinct social networks of agents transmitting information between 
neighbors: one connects the employers and the other connects the employees. The model has 
two options for these networks. They can be modeled by Erdős-Rényi random graphs (Erdős 
& Rényi, 1959) or by Watts-Strogatz networks (also misnamed as  ‘small-world networks’) 
(Watts-Strogatz, 1998). Erdős-Rényi graphs have small agent-agent distances (i.e., they are 
’small worlds’), an important property of real-world social networks. On the other hand, they 
don’t match other social network attributes (like the clustering coefficient or degree 
distribution). Watts-Strogatz networks have small peer-to-peer distances as well as local 
clustering (as in social networks). In TAXSIM an agent’s neighborhood doesn’t depend on 
(i.e., correlated with) any of its characteristics (savings, level of compliance, etc). 
Both employers and employees transmit information to their neighbors about the 
experienced accuracy of the authorities and their level of satisfaction. The average of the data 
received from neighbors affects the estimated accuracy of the authorities and the level of 
satisfaction respectively. 
TAX AUTHORITY 
The tax authority audits employees via employers. In each round, some employers are picked 
for audit depending on the audit frequency parameter. In case of the adaptive audit strategy, 
some of the employers are picked randomly, while others are selected from the social 
neighborhood of employers that have previously been audited with non-favorable results. 
During a particular audit the authority checks the contract of each employee of the 
employer’s. 
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During the audit, the real employment construct is determined with a certain probability 
(controlled by the ’accuracy of audit’ parameter of the model). If the authority finds mixed or 
non-registered employment both the employer and the employee is fined, proportionally to 
the tax evaded, and the employee is forced to quit the non-registered job.  
In the first version of the model the tax authority applies a fixed strategy: it does not 
change its behavior based on the experiences of previous audits. In the new version, a new, 
adaptive tax audit strategy is also introduced. 
GOVERNMENT 
In return of taxes paid, agents expect benefits and services from the government agent (e.g. 
health care for employees, or guaranteed procurement price for EU farmers, etc.). The levels 
of quality (for employees and for employers, respectively) are parameters of the model. The 
services are requested in every round by the agents according to probabilities set in 
parameters. The response is drawn form a distribution determined by the quality of service 
variable. Agents update their minimum level of compliance by calculating the weighted 
average of current and past experiences. 
 
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
This Section investigates the numerous parameters of the TAXSIM model, in order to analyse 
their effects on the mixture of the legal, mixed and non-registered employment in the studied 
economy. To this end, we followed the traditional factor analysis method that means 
sampling at the corners of a hypercube of the parameter space. We looked for the dimensions 
(parameters) that produce the highest change between their two levels (i.e., bottom and 
upper ’corner’). During this sensitivity analysis, we studied the parameters (dimensions) 
summarized in the table below (table 2.1.). The 2.1. table also specifies the two levels of the 
studied factors (parameters), i.e., the values of the given dimension at the ’corners’. The 
parameters not reported in the table are equivalent to the values listed in (Szabó–Gulyás–
Tóth, 2009). Therefore, for example, the number of employees was 200 employees and 40 
employers, we have studied an economy with almost no unemployment. 
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Table 2.1 
 The parameters of the sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tax rate 0,2 – 0,6 
Number of 
employers 
40 
Minimum tax rate nincs – 0,2 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employers' network 
0,01 – 0,3 
Tax audit probability 0,1 – 0,6 
Size of employer 
neighborhood 
0 – 2 
Tax audit accuracy 0,1 – 0,6 
Number of 
employees 
200 
Probability of 
employees’ job search 
0,01 – 0,3 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employees' network 
0,01 – 0,3 
Number of employers’ / 
employees’ groups 
0 – 4 
Size of employee 
neighborhood 
0 – 2 
 
The results of the study are most clearly shown by the effect on mixed employment. 
Figure 2.1 has the studied parameters on the horizontal axis, while their effects are on the 
vertical one. The highest the absolute value of a parameter’s effect (i.e., the bar’s distance 
from 0), the stronger its effect is on the output. Positive values show a positive correlation, 
while negative bars stand for negative effects. According to the figure, the highest effect is 
produced by the frequency and accuracy of audits. In addition, the connectivity and 
clustering of the employee and (separately) that of the employer network also has a 
significant effect. The taxrate, the minimal tax (a model of the minimal wage, see later) and 
the structure of employer and employee connections have only a secondary effect, via 
interactions with the above, most important parameters. 
The above parameters have similar effects on the number of legal and non-registered 
employments as well, via changing the number of mixed employments. This is because if the 
simulated economy moves from mixed employment, it does so gradually, by most contracts 
changing to legal or non-registered, depending on the parameters.  
According to the factor analysis, the most important factors for the composition of labour 
market in the studied economy are the frequency and accuracy of audits. Therefore, we 
performed a detailed analysis of the effects of these two parameters. The results are depicted 
on Figure 2.2. The values of the other parameters and the selection of values for the two 
studied dimensions (parameters) are summarized on Table 2.2. 
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Figure 2.1 
 The effect of parameters on number of mixed contracts 
 
 
Table 2.2 
 The parameters of the tax audit experiment 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tax rate 0,45 
Number of 
employers 
40 
Minimum tax rate none 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employers' network 
0,1 
Tax audit probability 0 – 0,1 
Size of employer 
neighborhood 
0 
Tax audit accuracy 0 – 1 
Number of 
employees 
200 
Probability of 
employees’ job search 
0,01 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employees' network 
0,1 
Number of employers’ / 
employees’ groups 
0 
Size of employee 
neighborhood 
0 
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Figure 2.2 
 The number of mixed and hidden contracts as a function of tax audits 
 
 
The figure shows quite clearly that, as long as the risk of an audit is negligible (the 
probability of an audit is small, or the accuracy of the performed audits is minimal), most of 
the contracts will be hidden. This dark picture lightens up dramatically when moving in 
either of the two dimensions. At some points we even observe rather steep, „phase transition 
like” changes. The interaction of the two parameters is also visible: along the diagonal 
marking their joint increase, the direction of the change is temporarily unstable, showing a 
turbulent region before reaching complete legality. In this tubulent region, the system’s 
behavior is path-dependent. That is, small early events, often random contingencies may 
have a significant later effect due to aggregating consequences. This kind of behavior is 
marked by narrow but sharp, needle-like peaks. 
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2.1. THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SITUATIONS 
Our analysis so far followed the assumptions of (Szabó-Gulyás-Tóth, 2010), working with a 
sector of the economy in which employment is almost full and labour market competition is 
slight. As we saw, in a situation like this the legality of employment is basically determined by 
the efficiency of the tax audit and, in partiular, on the two model parameters that govern it. 
Their combined effect was illustrated on Figure 2.2. 
It is known, however, that there are major interdependences between competition in the 
labour market and the unemployment accompanying it, on the one hand, and tax evasion on 
the other. Sociological and economic research based on case studies and field work drew the 
early attention to the relationship between informal employment, more specifically 
employment with tax evasion, and unemployment (Pahl, 1987 and Mingione, 1995). 
Theoretical economic approaches examined the possible impacts of tax evasion on the 
unemployment, demonstrating that a decline in tax evasion can reduce unemployment (Lisi, 
2010). The analysis of a reverse relationship. i.e., the impact of unemployment on tax evasion 
indicates that higher unemployment results in higher tax evasion (Alm-Yunus, 2009 and 
Cebula-Feige, 2011). 
Motivated by this background, in our next experiments we examine whether and in what 
ways the behaviour of the TAXSIM system changes when the modeled market sector is facing 
a different the economic situation. We examine a sector in which the labour market is 
strongly competitive. For this reason we have chosen parameter settings such that out of the 
300 employees available in the labour market on average only 200 employees are actually 
employed. Table 2.1.1. summarizes the settings that belong to this economy. As the table 
indicates, in this particular case we have also varied the values of the two parameters that 
have the major impact and determine the efficiency of tax audit. Figure 2.1.1. below 
summarizes the result of our analysis. 
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Table 2.1.1 
Parameters of a tax audit test performed in a saturated labour market 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tax rate 0,45 
Number of 
employers 
40 
Minimum tax rate none 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employers' network 
0,1 
Tax audit probability 0 – 0,1 
Size of employer 
neighborhood 
0 
Tax audit accuracy 0 – 1 
Number of 
employees 
300 
Probability of 
employees’ job search 
0,01 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employees' network 
0,1 
Number of employers’ / 
employees’ groups 
0 
Size of employee 
neighborhood 
0 
 
Figure 2.1.1 
 Number of mixed and hidden contracts depending  
on audit assuming 300 employees  
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As shown in Figure 2.1.1, in an economy generating a significant labour market 
competition the picture of the economy's legality is similar to the one shown in Figure 2.2. If 
the values of parameters code a small risk of being caught the number of non-registered 
employment is high, which declines considerably as the probability increases and may even 
reach zero in the intervals examined. At the same time it can also be seen that non-registered 
employment is significant at much higher audit probabilites than before. The nature of the 
transition between the two legality ranges (regimes) has also changed: the transition phase 
grows and, accordingly, its steepness reduces. The turbulent zone experienced earlier along 
the diagonal also seems to settle.   
The following Sections will work with this second economic situation, in which there is 
high competition in the labour market. 
2.2. A SEPARATED FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE TWO MODEL REGIMES 
The above analysis showed that the model possesses two rather different regimes of behavior 
in both labour market situations. Figures 2.2 and 2.1.1. show that an extremely small 
probability of tax audits and an extreme lack of the efficiency of audit render the economy 
exceedingly non-registered. 
The results at the same time also indicate that a high level of the efficiency of audit can 
result in curbing the weight of tax evasion and reducing the ratio of mixed and hidden forms 
of payment even when there is a rather small probability of audit. Reducing the level of tax 
evasion to a certain level can be implemented at a lower social cost than simply increasing tax 
audit frequency. This is the reason why it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the effect of 
increasing tax audit efficiency in the TAXSIM model. 
It also means at the same time that it is worthwile to reconsider our factor analysis 
discussed in the first section. In that analysis, we examined the relative impact of the 
parameters mapped against all parameter intervals and compared the relative size of the 
shifts in the outcomes experienced on them. If considering the above, however, it means that 
the results arrived at when using negligible tax audit risks merge with how the system 
behaves when "normal", i.e. more standard parameters are selected. In other words the steep 
increase experienced in the narrow ranges of extremely low tax audit probability and tax 
audit efficiency appears as a strong impact in the factor analysis.  
On the basis of these observations, we repeated the factor analysis, this time separating 
the extreme regimes of behavior into two separate parameter ranges. Then we proceeded to 
perform the sensitivity analysis again separately in the top region, when audit probability is 
low and in the bottom region, when audit probability is high. 
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Table 2.2.1. below summarizes the parameter settings used in the analysis of cases when 
audit probability and precision are high, providing the bottom and top values of the 
dimensions. (It is worthwhile to compare this table with Table 2.1. summarizing the first 
factor analysis.) 
Table 2.2.1 
 Parameters of the sensitivity analysis performed in the case  
of high audit probability 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tax rate 0,45 
Number of 
employers 
40 
Minimum tax rate none – 0,2 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employers' network 
0,01 – 0,3 
Tax audit probability 0,3 – 0,6 
Size of employer 
neighborhood 
0 – 2 
Tax audit accuracy 0,4 – 0,8 
Number of 
employees 
300 
Probability of 
employees’ job search 
0,01 – 0,3 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employees' network 
0,01 – 0,3 
Number of employers’ / 
employees’ groups 
0 – 4 
Size of employee 
neighborhood 
0 – 2 
Quality of government 
services for employees 
0,1 – 0,9 
Quality of government 
services for employers 
0,1 – 0,9 
Fine rate 0,5 Profit rate 0,1 
 
Figure 2.2.1. ranks parameters, more specifically parameter combinations according to 
their impacts on the number of legal, whereas figures 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 on the number of mixed 
and hidden contracts. The horizontal axis of the figures shows the parameters examined and 
their combinations, whereas the vertical axis indicates their impact on the number of mixed 
contracts. The higher the deviation from zero of each parameter is, the higher the effect of the 
parameter is on the outcome. For positive values the direction of the change in the outcome 
coincides with that of the value of the parameter, whereas it is just the opposite in the case of 
negative values. 
 
 
 
20 
 
Figure 2.2.1 
 The effect of parameters on the number of legal contracts  
 
Figure 2.2.3 
 The effect of parameters on the number of mixed contracts 
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Figure 2.2.4 
 The effect of parameters on the number of hidden contracts 
 
 
As evidenced by the figures, the highest effect on the outcome belongs to the probability 
of tax audits, their precision and the connectedness (density) of the employers' social 
network as well as the various interactions of these parameters. It is important to note that 
the connectedness of the employers' information network has a negative impact on tax 
evasion, i.e. it helps the emergence of legal contracts in the given region. A reason for this is 
the fact that the bottom value of the parameter that determines the density of the employers' 
network very likely results in an unconnected network, whereas the top parameter value 
almost always leads to a connected network. If the network is unconnected, on the other 
hand, no matter how deterrent the tax audit risk may be if the firms unaudited yet do not 
learn about it. Accordingly, transferring to a connected network from a low network density 
whitens the economy due to the propagation of the information. A good indication of this is 
that the most powerful factor in Figure 2.2.2. is the positive impact of this network density, 
whereas in Figure 2.2.4. it is also this factor that has the highest, but this time negative 
impact. In other words non-registered employment contracts can become widespread only 
when the employers' information network is unconnected. It seems to be in tune with the 
surface on Figure 2.2.3. (Just as a reminder: here we happen to be in the flat of the "plane" 
situated near the first corner.) 
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Table 2.2.5. summarizes the parameter values of our factor analysis performed with low 
tax audit probability and precision.  
Table 2.2.5 
 Parameters of the sensitivity analysis performed with low audit probability 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tax rate 0,45 
Number of 
employers 
40 
Minimum tax rate none – 0,2 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employers' network 
0,01 – 0,3 
Tax audit probability 0 – 0,25 
Size of employer 
neighborhood 
0 – 2 
Tax audit accuracy 0 – 0,45 
Number of 
employees 
300 
Probability of 
employees’ job search 
0,01 – 0,3 
Probability of the 
connectedness of the 
employees' network 
0,01 – 0,3 
Number of employers’ / 
employees’ groups 
0 – 4 
Size of employee 
neighborhood 
0 – 2 
Quality of government 
services for employees 
0,1 – 0,9 
Quality of government 
services for employers 
0,1 – 0,9 
Fine rate 0,5 Profit rate 0,1 
 
Figure 2.2.6 
 The effect of parameters on the number of legal contracts  
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Figure 2.2.6 ranks parameters, more specifically parameter combinations, according to 
their effect on the number of legal contracts. Figures 2.2.7. and 2.2.8. show the same 
information for the number of mixed and hidden contracts, respectively. The horizontal axis 
of the figures shows the parameters analysed, and their combinations, whereas the vertical 
axis shows their effect on the number of mixed contracts. The higher the deviation from zero 
of each parameter is, the higher the effect of the parameter is on the outcome.  For positive 
values the direction of the change in the outcome coincides with that of the value of the 
parameter, whereas it is just the opposite for negative values.   
 
Figure 2.2.7 
Effect of the parameters on the number of mixed contracts  
 
 
Clearly, the figures suggest that, here again, the risk of tax audits has a decisive role. An 
indication to this is the fact that the two parameters affecting this take the first place in both 
figures – in various combinations. However, the novelty here is that the 
EmployerServiceQuality satisfaction appears as a decisive factor in the emergence of hidden 
economy. In Figure 2.2.8 it shows up on its own in the third place, while it appears in 
combination with audit precision in the second place and in combination with audit 
frequency in the fourth place. In the case of legal employment government services extended 
to employees shows up in combination in the fourth place. Similarly to what we saw earlier, 
parameters of the employers' information network also play a role in legal and mixed 
employment. 
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Figure 2.2.8 
Effect of the parameters on the number of hidden contracts  
 
 
3. THE EFFECT OF ADAPTIVE TAX AUDITS 
 
The tax authority can choose several audit strategies in its action against tax evasion. There 
are empirical and experimental results to suggest that the audit strategies chosen have an 
important influence on the rate of tax evasion, independently from audit probability. Engel-
Hines have shown that retrospective tax audit, which is performed when the tax payer has 
been found evading tax in the given year, the tax returns for previous years are also audited, 
can curb tax evasion to a much greater extent than if the size of the fine were doubled (Engel 
– Hines, 1999). Other research indicated the curbing effect of the audit experience on the one 
hand (i.e. the tax payer has been audited before), or the audit frequency expected by tax 
payers (Kleven et al. 2011, Kleven-Schultz, 2012). Tan and Yim highlight the effect of the so 
called strategic uncertainty on the basis of research results and demonstrate that a high 
degree of uncertainty of the audits diminished tax evasion to a great extent if compared to 
situations when tax payers had been informed about the probability of the audit (Tan-Yim, 
2011). 
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Accordingly, it is worthwhile to examine with the TAXSIM model tax payer’s behaviour 
under various audit strategies. In the following, we examine a Tax Authority that, in certain 
percentage of the cases, does not select the audit target at random, but uses an adaptive 
selection strategy. The latter means that the choice is made from among the direct network 
neighbours of the employers having been caught with non-registered (or mixed) labour 
contracts. 
The horizontal axis shows the ratio of the number of employers the tax authority selects 
randomly and the number of those selected adaptively for audit. At 0 the selection is 
adaptive, at 1 it is random. The probability and precision of tax audit varies in the various 
rows. Both are 10% in the first, 20% in the second, and 30% in the third row. The trend that 
can be observed indicates that the higher the ratio of adaptive selection by the tax authority 
is, the less is the number of hidden contracts and the more is that of legal contracts. 
Figure 3.1 
The effect of adaptive tax audits on the number of the various contracts 
 
 
These results indicate that, instead of the former random selection, it will be worthwhile 
for the tax authority to select new audit targets from among the acquaintances of employers 
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having been caught evading tax. In reality the tax authority audits certain firms repeatedly, 
others randomly. If viewed from these results, it might be worth considering the introduction 
of some sort of adaptive audit strategy by the tax authority, at the same time it might be also 
worthwhile to continue to develop the TAXSIM model as well so that it is enabled to better 
model the prevailing practice of tax audits. 
 
4. THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGE ON TAX EVASION 
 
The implementation or increase of the minimum wage can exercise diverse contrasting 
effects in an economy on the incidence of tax evasion. A special situation emerged in this 
regard in Hungary in 2001-2002, when the government increased the minimum wage in two 
steps by a total of 96%. According to assumptions, the minimum wage contributes to the 
whitening of the economy because the employers that used to pay their employees a mixed 
compensation package (in a partly admitted and partly unadmitted manner), would either 
reduce or completely discontinue paying black moneys. This assumption has been supported 
by Tonin's theoretical model and his analysis carried out on Hungarian data (Tonin, 2011). 
The findings of other researchers (Köllő-Kertesi, 2004, Halpern et al. 2004, Elek et al. 2012, 
Benedek et al. 2013) also consider the contrasting effect of raising the minimum wage. 
Namely, the above effect can be counteracted by the fact that, due to the increased wage 
charges resulting from the increased minimum wage, employers on the one hand formally 
dismiss their employees, then they employ them without registration, more specifically 
increase the share of black compensation within the compensation package.  
In the following we introduce the modelled effect of the minimum wage on the legality of 
employment. As it has been discussed in our previous work (Szabó-Gulyás-Tóth, 2010), 
minimum wage appears in the form of an increased tax charge in the TAXSIM model in all 
the employment mixes that contain a reported income (as well). Now we examine the 
incidence of mixed and black compensation at various minimum wage (tax payment) levels. 
In the top row of the following figure the diagram we saw earlier can be seen, which 
shows the number of mixed and hidden contracts in the function of the probability and 
precision of the audit. The figure on the left hand side shows the sum of the two categories, 
whereas the one on the right hand side shows them separately (with hidden contracts in the 
middle). The minimum size of the tax payable is 16% in the second row, 30% in the third row 
and 44% in the fourth row. The average tax rate is 45%.  
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Figure 4.1 
 The effect of the minimum tax payable on the number of various contract types  
 
 
According to Figure 4.1. the minimum wage slightly legalizes economy in the particular 
range of parameters of the TAXSIM model, as the area of the "plane" visible in the first part 
of the three-dimensional surfaces expands. Even with lower tax audit precision and 
frequency the size of non-registered employment is smaller and, at the same time, the 
transfer from non-registered into legal becomes steeper.   
Comparing the first and the second rows of the figure one can also observe that the 
implementation of the minimum wage reduces the ratio of mixed employment compared to 
hidden employment in the economy that is becoming increasingly legal. So those who are 
unable to adapt (i.e. become legal), are often forced to withdraw into the hidden economy. At 
the same time the remaining rows of the figure reveal that this effect reverses as the size of 
the minimum wage increases. When this happens a slight rearrangement can be observed in 
non-registered employment from hidden economy towards mixed employment.  
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It is also worth noticing at the same time that, in the transitory range, mixed employment 
is conspicuously "pointed" in every figure, which, as we discussed earlier, indicates a strong 
path dependence.  
 
5. THE EFFECT OF SATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT 
 
In the classical microeconomic approach of analyis of tax evasion one of the important tools 
of action against tax evasion is the increased probability of an audit by the tax authority. The 
higher the probability of audits, ceteris paribus, the higher is the probability of being caught 
and the lower will be the incidence of tax evasion. In this context, the government can be 
considered as an agent possessing the power of control and punishment, while businesses 
and employees, as tax payers can be considered as agents financing governmental 
expenditures. 
Subsequently several researchers pointed out that tax-payers' willingness to pay taxes 
also depended on how far tax payers recognise the reasonableness of the tax levied by the 
government (Brennan-Buchanan, 1977; Spicer-Becker, 1980). Further research also drew 
attention to the role of tax moral and, on the other hand, to the importance of the 
interactions between the government and the tax payer in determining tax payer’s behaviour 
(Alm et al, 1992; Alm et al. 1993; Frey – Torgler, 2007;  Torgler et al., 2010). 
Economic psychology research examining the relationship between the government and 
the tax payer has found that a growing probability of tax audit – contrary to the prediction of 
the classical microeconomic models – tends to reduce rather than increase the probability of 
tax payment, as it ruins voluntary tax compliance willingness to a great extent (Kirchler, 
2007; Kirchler et al. 2008). According to the same theory, the more the tax payer considers 
the government to be a cooperating partner and the embodiment of good governance, the 
more they will be willing to pay tax. International comparative studies also underlined the 
inter-relationship of governance quality and the relevant tax payer perception and tax 
payment willingness (Cebula-Feige, 2011). 
In this Section we examine the effect of satisfaction with the government. In contrast to 
our earlier paper (Szabó-Gulyás-Tóth, 2010), however, this time we apply the gradual 
variations in the quality of governmental services to an economy not having reached a 
balance. (In our earlier work we examined the effect of deteriorating quality after the 
economy reached a fixed point.) This time we examine, in separate simulation runs, the kind 
of balance reached by economies as a result of different qualities of governmental services. 
The government extends two service types in the TAXSIM model: one for employers and 
another one for employees. In the figures below we show these two service qualities (and, 
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respectively, the parameters that regulate them, between 0.0 and 1.0) on the horizontal axis. 
The vertical axis displays mixed contracts in Figure 5.1, legal contracts in Figure 5.2 and 
hidden contracts in Figure 5.3.  
Figure 5.1 
The effect of quality of government services on the number of mixed contracts 
 
The figures clearly indicate that the quality of the services extended to employers by the 
government dominates the quality of the services offered to employees.  It is probably due to 
the fact that employees are involved in a strong competition with each other in the analysed 
economy for which reason they are forced to avail of any possibility to work and listen to a 
lesser extent to their own conviction during the bargaining that determines the tax mix.  
In addition, it is also obvious that the better the quality of company services is, the whiter 
the economy is. When service quality is low employment is overwhelmingly black. It turns 
into mixed employment in the central range, whereas it is dominated by legal employment in 
the high quality region. These transitions are modulated by the quality of employee services, 
but in this case we cannot speak about clear and strong trends. This dimension seems to play 
a role in the transitional regions, primarily through manifesting path dependence.  
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Figure 5.2 
The effect of quality of government services on the number of legal contracts  
 
Figure 5.3 
The effect of government services on the number of hidden contracts 
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6. THE EFFECT OF THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
The social networks of tax payers affect the agents’ willingness to pay taxes in two ways: on 
the one hand they learn through these networks about other agents' tax payment behaviour, 
on the other hand they learn about the probability with which the tax authority audited those 
who belong to the network. The size and the type of the tax payers' social network, therefore, 
a priori, can greatly influence the tax payers' willingness to pay tax.  
In this Section we examine the effect of the structure of social networks on the 
composition of employment. Two kinds of social networks are available in the TAXSIM 
model: one is the information channel of employers, the other is through which employees 
share their information. In the following, we examine these consecutively. In both cases we 
shall examine separately the case when we model the network with the Erdős-Rényi version 
of the random network (Erdős-Rényi, 1959) and the case when the network is generated by 
the „small world model” of Watts and Strogatz (Watts-Strogatz, 1998). 
Before we proceed to presenting our results it is worth recalling the basic features of the 
networks analysed. The Erdős-Rényi network features N nodes and all edges with the same 
probability „p”. If this probability (which coincides with the expected density of the resulting 
network) is smaller than ~1/N, the resulting network will probably not be connected. If „p” is 
larger than ~3/N, the network can practically be considered connected. It is important to 
note that Erdős-Rényi networks, if connected, possess the so called "small world" property. 
In other words the average (expected) length of the shortest paths between node pairs scales 
with log(N). 
In comparison, in the Watts-Strogatz model the N nodes are placed in a regular spatial 
grid so that each node is connected to its neighbors situated at most k (>1) steps from it. In 
this grid the so called clustering is high, which may be more precisely referred to as 
transitivity. (Two neighbours of a node are likely to be connected themselves.). It is 
important, however that the average distance between the node pairs (the average of the 
shortest paths) is relatively large. The grid, therefore, is not a "small world", as the expected 
average distance scales with √N. Therefore, an important element of the Watts-Strogatz 
model is the so called "re-wiring" (or, its variation, the "shortcutting") process that adjusts 
the links of the grid at random, with probability p. Alternatively, we add as a "shortcut", with 
the probability concerned, the edges not included in the network.  In both cases, even at very 
low "p" values (i.e., very few modified connections) the average distance "collapses" and the 
network becomes a "small world". In the meantime there is only a small and slow change in 
transitivity.   
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Consequently, Watt-Strogatz networks (with most parameter selections) are transitive 
and "small worlds" at the same time. In addition to that they provide an excellent tool for 
analysing the effect of "small worldness" (i.e., the expected length of the shortest paths 
between node pairs) on the processes underway in the network. In this case the issue to 
examine is whether at low "p" values (i.e. large average distances) the system behaves in the 
same way as in the case of connected Erdős-Rényi networks.  
 
6.1. THE EFFECT OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL NETWORK OF EMPLOYEES  
In Figures 6.1.1. and 6.1.2. we vary the structure of the employees' social network. On the 
former Figure the network belongs to the Erdős-Rényi family. In the latter figure, on the 
other hand, networks were generated using the Watts-Strogatz model. 
The Figures show nine panels. The probability and precision of tax audit are equally 0,1 in 
row one, 0,2 in row 2, and 0,4 in row three. The figures show the number of legal contracts in 
the column on the left hand side, mixed employment in the central column and the size of 
hidden economy in the right hand side column. In the figures the horizontal axis shows the 
value of the "p" probability parameter of the particular network model (i.e. the probability of 
edges in the case of the Erdős-Rényi network and the probability of „shortcuts” in the case of 
the Watts-Strogatz network), while the vertical axis shows the amount of the particular 
employment.  
In Figure 6.1.1. we analyse the effect of the parameter regulating the probability of the 
connectedness of employees' social network in the ranges between 0.0 and 0.02. This range 
includes the critical region between 1/N-3/N discussed earlier, when the network generated 
becomes connected. As Erdős-Rényi random networks are essentially stochastic, a single 
network generated always contains certain elements of eventuality. Therefore, we have drawn 
the averages of the results of 10 runs in the figure for each parameter combination. The 
dotted lines shown in the figure indicate the result of the measures we conducted in the 
course of the tax audit tests of Section 2.1. (Those runs were conducted with 0.1 network 
density). 
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Figure 6.1.1 
 Effect on the number of hidden, mixed and legal contracts in the Erdős-Rényi 
random network of the change in the parameter indicating the connectedness of 
employees' social network. 
 
 
The main lesson that can be drawn from the Figure is that the role of the network on the 
result of the model primarily appears with high tax audit probability and precision. (This also 
coincides with the results of our factor analyses). This effect becomes manifested the most in 
the lowest row, where it is apparent that legal contracts become dominant with the 
emergence of connectedness. The results of the connected network regime also coincide with 
the results measured at high connectivity (indicated with a dotted line) and thus can be 
considered as monotonous. One interpretation of this observation is that information learnt 
through the network becomes important when it actually has an affect of changing behavior 
(i.e., when the perceived high audit probability prompts the agents to legalize their 
contracts).  
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We analysed in Figure 6.1.2. the effect of the parameter regulating the probability of 
„shortcuts” int he employees' social network, in the range between 0.0 and 0.02 range, in the 
case of Watts-Strogatz networks. As we did it in the previous case, here again we took the 
averages of the results of 10 runs for each parameter combination. Here again the dotted 
lines seen in the figures indicate the results of the tests performed in Section 2.1. 
Figure 6.1.2 
The effect on the number of hidden, mixed and legal contracts on the Watts-
Strogatz network of the parameter indicating the probability of connectedness 
of the employee social network when the parameter for neighbours is 2  
 
 
The main lesson one can draw from the Figure is that in the case of Watts-Strogatz 
networks the probability of "shortcuts" does not have any significant impact on the outcome 
of the TAXSIM model. In general terms it means that if employee networks are connected, 
the specific structure of this network does not influence the behaviour of the system. This is 
akin to many findings related to spreading processes, where the control parameter was often 
found to be the average distance in the network. 
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6.2. THE EFFECT OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL NETWORK OF EMPLOYERS 
In Figures 6.2.1. and 6.2.2. we vary the social network of employers. In the analyses of the 
former figure the network belongs to the Erdős-Rényi family. For the latter figure, we 
generated networks using the Watts-Strogatz model.  
Here again nine panels can be found in the figures. The probability and precision of tax 
audit are equally 0.1 in Figure 1, 0.2 in Figure 2 and 0.4 in Figure 3. The figures show the 
number of legal contracts in the left-hand side column, that of mixed employment in the 
column in the middle and the size of hidden economy in the right hand side column. Each 
figure shows the value of the „p” probability parameter of the network model concerned on 
the horizontal axis (i.e. the probability of the edges for the Erdős-Rényi network and that of 
the "shortcuts" for the Watts-Strogatz network) and the number indicating the size of the 
particular type of employment on the vertical axis.  
Figure 6.2.1 
Effect of the connectedness probability parameter of the employers' social 
network on the number of hidden, mixed and legal contracts on the Erdős-Rényi 
random network  
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In Figure 6.2.1. we examine the effect of the parameter regulating the probability of the 
connectedness of the employers' social network in the 0.0 and 0.2 range. In the case of this 
network this range includes the critical path between 1/N-3/N discussed earlier, when the 
network generated becomes connected. (We took the average of the results of 10 runs for 
each parameter combination.)    
Here again the role of the network in the outcome of the model appears primarily when 
the probability of tax audit and precision is high. (It also coincides with the results of our 
factor analyses). This effect becomes manifest the most in the lowest row (although it is 
already obvious in the middle row). It is clearly visible that legal contracts dominate as 
connectedness emerges.  (See our interpretation above.) 
Figure 6.2.2 
The effect of the probability of „shortcuts” in the employers' social network on 
the number of hidden, mixed and legal contracts on the Watts-Strogatz 
network, when the parameter for the number of neighbours is 2. 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
In Figure 6.2.2. we examine the effect of the probability of „shortcuts” in the employers' 
social network in the 0.0 and 0.2 range, in the case of Watts-Strogatz networks. As earlier, 
here again we took the average of the results of 10 runs for each parameter combination.  
The main lesson is that in case of Watts-Strogatz networks the probability of "shortcuts" 
does not have a significant effect on the outcome of the TAXSIM model. Here again the 
general observation is that as long as the employers' network is connected, the behaviour of 
the system is unaffected by the specific structure of the network. 
 
7. THE UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE 
 
Earlier analyses into tax payer’s behaviour failed to attach significance to the effect of 
business cycles on tax evasion. One of the manifestations of the effect of business cycles can 
be the rate of unemployment among tax payers. More recent empirical research indicates a 
significant and positive relationship between the size of unemployment and the willingness to 
pay tax: a higher rate of unemployment is accompanied by an increased prevalence of tax 
evasion (Alm-Yunus, 2009 and Cebula-Feige, 2011).  
In our opinion the analysis of the tax payer's perception and expectations is especially 
important from this viewpoint as well: to what extent does the tax payer feel themselves 
threatened by unemployment and, consequently, how does their willingness to accept less 
than legal contracts changes?  
In the TAXSIM model the unemployment experience influences employees' behaviour in 
two ways. In the basic model job hunters continue to stick to their own tax payment concept 
(another driver of which is the quality of governmental services) as long as their financial 
possibilities make it possible. However, as soon as they run out of their accumulated money, 
they become more open to the employers' less than legal offers. 
In the extended model employees remember their previous unemployment experience 
and the accompanying discomforts. So, in case of a repeated job search (i.e. unemployment) 
the employee will immediately seize every possibility and take an open attitude to even less 
than legal employer offers.  
In this Section we compare the ways these two models of unemployment experience effect 
the model’s outcome. The figure below shows the probability and precision of tax audit on the 
horizontal axis, whereas the vertical axis shows how the number of non-registered contracts 
works out. 
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Figure 7.1 
Effect of the unemployment experience on non-registered employment  
 
 
As testifed by Figure 7.1. taking the unemployment experience explicitly into 
consideration clearly increases the probability of the appearance of black and gray economy. 
It is worth noting that in this case the precision/efficiency of tax audit will have a much more 
significant effect on the outcome than the mere probability of it.  
It is also remarkable that the effect of accuracy is not linear in the lower region. If audit is 
totally inaccurate (0.0 probability), the economy will understandably be black. With low, but 
positive precision, on the other hand, we get into the non-legal regime, which is then followed 
by the dominance of registered employment as audit accuracy increases. 
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Conclusions 
 
The main objective of our research has been the analysis of the relationship of the 
government and tax payers, more specifically the exploration of the impact such relations 
have on paying taxes. We have used the TAXSIM agent-based simulation model for our 
analyses and this study reports our detailed results. 
First we discussed the general behaviour of the model in various parameter ranges. When 
we analysed the factors embracing the first and broadest range we came to the conclusion 
(coinciding with previous experiences) that the model's behaviour is influenced to the 
greatest extent by the probability of tax audit and its precision (two model parameters). Then 
we systematically applied the model to various combinations of these parameters and found 
that the model's behaviour falls into two well separated regimes. If the probability and the 
precision of tax audits are low, the great majority of the contracts are non-registered (either 
mixed or hidden ones), while a higher probability and precision of tax audits result in more 
legal contracts.  
The same general pattern emerges both in case of mild labour market competition and 
full employment and strong labour market competition and lack of employment. However, in 
an environment where almost every employee has a job, employees are less likely motivated 
to evade taxes and hidden contracts appear practically only when there is no tax audit at all. 
Contrary to this, in a more competitive labour market, the two different outcome regimes 
appear different: it takes a much higher audit probability to make the transition happen and 
to lead to a legal economy. When analysing the two market scenarios separately, we found 
that the parameters influencing the traits of social (employer and employee) networks as well 
as the parameters influencing the services extended by the government are also important in 
determining the level of tax avoidance, in addition to the efficiency of tax audits.  
The first step in the analysis of the specificrelationship between the government and tax 
payers was the review of the case when tax audit efficiency grows. We examined two audit 
strategies and, specifically, the mixed strategies deriving from them: a random and an 
adaptive strategy of audit. In the first case the tax authority randomly selects employers as 
audit targets, while in the second, they audit the acquaintances of employers having been 
caught in tax evasion earlier.  According to our results, legal employment grows considerably 
and hidden employment declines as the tax authority selects adaptively to an increasing 
extent among employers. The adaptive conduct of the tax authority is an efficient tool in the 
campaign against tax evasion.  
Another area of the relationship between the government and tax payers is the quality of 
the services offered by the government. Analysing this issue we examined an economy with a 
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strong oversupply in the labour market and found that services extended to employers 
dominate.  In the range of the parameters where the quality of the services offered to 
employers is poor, a considerable amount of hidden employment can be detected, whereas 
when the quality of such services is good, legal employment is considerable and mixed 
contracts dominate with the interim values of service parameters.   
We also examined the effect of an eventually implemented and, respectively, increased 
minimum wage. We took the minimum wage into consideration in the model as a minimum 
amount of tax payable. According to our results the minimum wage slightly legalizes 
economy in the particular parameter range of the TAXSIM model. The size of non-registered 
employment tends to decline already with a lower level of tax audit precision and less 
frequent auditing and, along with it, the steepness of the transition from non-registered to 
legal also increases. At the same time it can be concluded that the implementation of the 
minimum wage reduces the ratio of mixed employees against hidden employees in the 
economy that is otherwise becoming legalized. That is, those who are unable to adapt (turn 
legal) will be more often compelled to withdraw into the hidden economy instead of mixed 
employment. At the same time our results suggest that this effect reverses when the size of 
the minimum wage grows. When this happens, a slight change can be observed among non-
registered forms of employments moving from hidden economy towards mixed employment.  
In addition to the relationship between the government and the tax players we also 
examined the effect of the employers' and employees' social network structure. With regards 
to social networks we examined two different network structures, the Erdős-Rényi-type 
random network and the Watts-Strogatz-type network. The main lesson deriving from the 
results is that the effect of the network structure on the result of the model is pronounced at 
high levels of tax audit probability and precision. (This coincides with the results of our factor 
analyses). This effect manifests itself mostly in the region when network becomes connected, 
leading to a situation where legal contracts tend to dominate. With the Watts-Strogatz 
networks the likelihood of „short cuts” does not have a significant effect on the outcome of 
the TAXSIM model. In general, it means that as long as the employee network is connected, 
the specific structure of the network will not influence the behaviour of the system.  
Finally, we examined the effect of the experience of unemployment on legal employment. 
We used two models of this experience: in the first employees accumulated assets as they 
worked and they lived on such assets when they were unemployed. In this model employees 
accept an un-registered contract only in the event they run out of their accumulated wealth. 
In the other version, in the event of repeated unemployment, employees are immediately 
prepared to accept a less than legal contract. According to our results the explicit 
consideration of the unemployment experience clearly increases the probability of black and 
grey economies.  
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To summarize, our analyses conducted using the TAXSIM model suggest that 
governments can choose among several efficient tools to improve tax compliance and curb 
tax evasion. In addition to improving the frequency and precision of tax audits, the 
implementation of an adaptive strategy of tax audit may also be effective, as well as reducing 
the threat of unemployment among employees (i.e., reducing the rate of unemployment), or 
improving the quality of government services. 
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